The word “humor” is associated with that which is comical or funny, these terms being associated with amusement or laughter. We could assert that what one finds humorous is a product of subjectivity, upbringing, class status, habituation, etc. However, what needs to be asserted is that the realm of humor–as with every other domain of the sentient, living world–has been infected with the logic of patriarchy. It is for this reason that, when the issue of humor is discussed, many people find themselves adhering to the sexist adage “No one likes a funny girl.” 

Where does this expression come from? It comes from the social conditioning, from gender roles that imply that women should laugh at men’s jokes; they should not be the ones making the jokes.   After all, doing so would constitute a display of subjectivity, inventiveness, and wit, attributes oftentimes deemed undesirable or at least unnecessary in female people. Within the heteronormative framework through which women are forced to see the world, female people are continually taught to appreciate a man who makes them laugh because humor constitutes an attribute they are supposed to deem desirable: intelligence. Conversely, men are taught to desire a woman who will laugh at his jokes, a woman who will give him such supportive, subordinated attention.  If we recognize that humor has historically been a masculine characteristic associated with the convergence of intellect and dominance, we can see how and why the expression “No one likes a funny girl” gained traction within mainstream/malestream spaces in which women are expected to conform to aspects of femininity, which include operating in supportive, modest ways that are antithetical to the displays of singularity and subjectivity associated with telling jokes (whether on stage or in the midst of any given audience). Within this framework, the phrase “No one likes a funny girl” actually means “No one likes a female person who deviates from prototypical, patriarchal scripts which reinforce male domination and female submission as appropriate, ideal, and/or unavoidable modes of being in the world.”  

As a radical feminist, it is important for me to assert that I like funny women and understand why many people don’t. One reason many sexist people don’t like funny women is that when female comics speak, they are oftentimes doing so from a feminist perspective which involves calling sexist men out and questioning patriarchal ideologies (such as the idea that rape jokes are funny). This type of truth-telling infused humor isn’t going to be funny to people who operate within mainstream/malestream cultures, especially since part of participating in a patriarchal discursive formation includes telling and laughing at sexist jokes that minimize female experiences and deny that women are fully human.  

  Relevantly, the “type” of woman who chooses to become a comic (meaning that she is thinking and writing and willing to share her thoughts with a scrutinizing public) is going to be off-putting to sexist men and women who would prefer that women just conform to the patriarchal edicts of smiling docilely, shutting up (how often is a girl told to ‘Be quiet’?), and not thinking too much. Although there is actually no “type” for a comic, women who choose this occupation are oftentimes the “type” that sexist people don’t like, which is a woman who is 1. thinking and 2. thinking dissidently. 

  To expound on the low level of patriarchal receptivity to the female assertiveness that comes to life when women tell jokes, it is important to note what antipathy towards funny female people says about the maintenance of male supremacist values. Specifically, male supremacist values maintain that it is still inappropriate for women to express themselves publicly when the expression is not one of objectification or the purporting of patriarchal paradigms such as a wedding in which the bride is displayed as an object to be given from one man to another. Women going public to express thoughts or convey dissidence (rather than to present their bodies as objects that exist for the visual pleasure of women) will be reprimanded through the punitive process of not enjoying the sense of belongingness that results from being liked. (Yet why should thinking women seek inclusion and belongingness within a sexist community or mourn their exclusion from its patriarchal parameters?)  

Note that this issue of women not being liked for humor also extends to the realm of writing. Like women who think humorously, women who think through writing are oftentimes not liked due to their displayed ability to process reality independently and autonomously. This independent and autonomous thinking oftentimes surfaces in antagonism to patriarchal forms of logic which require women to exist within a framework in which they are ancillary and subsidiary to men. With these things in mind, it is important to draw attention to Joanna Russ’s important book How To Suppress Women’s Writing, which exposes why and how women’s writing is suppressed by the patriarchal powers. 

Note also that understanding the patriarchal underpinnings of suggesting that women aren’t funny does not mean that every female comic is. Every female comic, to be clear, isn’t. But this does not mean that judgments regarding funniness are not oftentimes clouded by patriarchal programming pertaining to why some people—women—come to be thought of as the people who are not allowed to be funny. 

In summation, I like funny women. What I don’t particularly like is the perpetuation of a patriarchal culture in which the wit and talent of female people is not appreciated. I also don’t like how, within a patriarchal culture, forms of “humor” that reflect perversion and woman-hating, such as rape jokes, are actually considered funny. All sorts of disturbing forms of logic exist to legitimate the notion that a joke about rape could be funny, and none of them ever make a modicum of sense. In her important essay “The New Misandry: Man-Hating in 1972,” Joanna Russ points out that “in the small town I live in there were several incidents of rape last year, and a common response to them was laughter.” Thus the problem is not only that people attempt to justify the egregiously inappropriate nature of rape jokes with arguments regarding the realm of humor having no creative bounds or that this form of humor works to help individuals process trauma; the problem is also that when rapes occur, people actually laugh. 

So again, the problem is not that no one likes a funny woman. The problem is that the perpetuation and proliferation of the patriarchy shapes what people think is funny and who can be perceived as funny. In recognizing these realities, radical feminists and any other individual who has pledged their disloyalty to the patriarchy are free to think critically and complexly about what they actually find humor in. Personally, I prefer jokes that unapologetically poke fun at the patriarchy.  

Read it. Then read it again.

            Words, amongst many things, are the vehicles through which meaning is conveyed. They convey thought, provide contexts for experiences, and enable the transmission of ideas from one individual to another. In many cases, words operate as a medium of communication from one society to another. In recognizing the profound and powerful impact that words can have in individual lives and society as a collective, it may seem surprising that people would attach the term “only” to words. The implication made with the phrase “only words” is that terms have limited power. The assessment is problematic for many reasons, including the fact that words have seemingly unlimited power, being the catalyst for wars, death, suicides, genocides, and numerous other atrocities.

            The phrase “only words” can also be contextually problematic, such as when it is used to legitimize the production and proliferation of pornography. The individuals who make this assertion do so to ensure that pornography is not censored, made illegal, or subjected to other forms of monitoring which might limit its consumption and cultural normalcy. In her important book Only Words, Catharine MacKinnon draws attention to this issue, honing in on the false claim that pornography is only words in order to reveal that it much more than words. It is words that act hatefully or, to paraphrase MacKinnon, act as hate speech.    MacKinnon opens her text with a direct reference to the torturous nature of sexual abuse that exists, with this reality grounding her work within a radical feminist context that refuses to downplay, minimize, or ignore the gravity of sexual assault. Specifically, MacKinnon writes

Imagine that for hundreds of years your most formative traumas, your daily suffering and pain, the abuse you live through, the terror you live with, are unspeakable-not the basis of literature. You grow up with your father holding you down and covering your mouth so another man can make a horrible searing pain between your legs. When you are older, your husband ties you to the bed and drips hot wax on your nipples and brings in other men to watch and makes you smile through it. Your doctor will not give you drugs he has addicted you to unless you suck his penis (3).

MacKinnon uses this descriptive reference as a precursor to explaining how the sexual abuse that is done to women does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it exists within a pornographic framework in which the sexual abuse that transpires is oftentimes recorded in video or picture format. These recordings and/or photographs are then circulated amongst men who enjoy seeing women experience pain or, alternatively, enjoy pretending to think that women experience pleasure in being raped or subjected to violent forms of “sex.” In addition to drawing attention to the degradation that women experience through these sexual assaults and their recordings, MacKinnon brings the reader’s awareness to what I refer to as a triple dose of dehumanization–the process through which a subordinated individual is subjected to three forms of dehumanizing humiliation through one subjugating act. In this case, the triple dose of dehumanization transpires as, in the process of 1. being sexually assaulted and 2. being filmed throughout one’s subordination, and 3. being forced to smile throughout one’s subordination. Specifically, MacKinnon writes of men who find pornographic pictures thus:

fathers, husbands, and doctors saw the pictures, liked them, and did the same things to them, things they had never done or said they wanted before. As these other women were held down, or tied up, or examined on the table, pictures like the pictures of you were talked about or pointed to: do what she did, enjoy it the way she enjoyed it. The same acts that were forced on you are forced on them; the same smile you were forced to smile, they must smile. There is, you find, a whole industry in buying and selling captive smiling women to make such pictures, acting as if they like it (5).

            Here, the multi-faceted dimensions of pornography’s degradation of women becomes plain. In addition to being subjected to pain, the production of pornography involves denying individuals the subjectivity involved in being able to authentically, accurately convey their real thoughts and emotions.  Instead, women are reduced to robotic, vapid smiles. In her important essay “Oppression,” Marilyn Frye points out that women being constantly told to smile functions as an oppressive tool which reduces female people to the sphere of acquiescence. Specifically, she writes “it is often a requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signal our docility and our acquiescence in our situation. We need not, then, be taken note of. We acquiesce in being made invisible, in our occupying no space. We participate in our own erasure” (2). The forced fake smile that women are forced to wear thus engenders two undesirable outcomes: slavishness and erasure. The smile functions as part of the process of bringing to life the paradoxical existence that women are forced to live out: appearing and not appearing, being physically present and somehow literally absent as their personhood is reduced to an identity prop which bolsters false notions of the omnipotent male to whom the weak and inferior female lovingly submits. When the forced fake smile patriarchal sequence surfaces in pornography, it speaks this same subordinating language over and over again, reminding consumers that women do not exist as real material sentient beings with thoughts and emotions; rather, they are mutable malleable non-subjects that men can shape and mold to any form they desire. And as made evident by pornography, that form is nonexistence insomuch as existence necessitates a being who thinks and feels above and apart from the orders of an other.

            When one becomes aware that pornography is a form of speech which works to erase women through the process of depicting them in subordinating, slave-like positions, the reality of this mode of communication constituting hate speech should become glaringly evident. Yet, as MacKinnon points out, the proponents of pornography insist that it is not hate speech insomuch as hate speech is conceptualized as words that cause harm. According to MacKinnon, individuals who support pornography’s production and consumption and who argue against the notion that it is harmful suggest that “The pictures themselves do nothing. They are an expression of ideas, a discussion, a debate, a discourse. How repressed and repressive can you be? They are constitutionally protected speech” (5,6). Yet, as MacKinnon shows throughout her book, pornography cannot be accurately conceptualized within the frameworks of 1. harmlessness and 2. ideational expression that its proponents attempt to advance. Rather than agreeing that pornography is simply speech, MacKinnon, in consonance with Andrea Dworkin, argues that it is deleterious speech because of what it does. Specifically, MacKinnon and Dworkin define pornography as “graphic sexually explicit materials that subordinate women through pictures or words” (32) and go on to point out that it promotes sexual abuse. Within MacKinnon’s definitional framework, what pornography says and does becomes evident. As she states, her definition “includes the harm of what pornography says—its function as defamation or hate speech—but defines it and it alone in terms of what it does—its role as subordination, as sex discrimination, including what it does through what it says” (22). MacKinnon’s definition is consonant with reality and antithetical to the fallacious understanding of pornography purported by its proponents; indeed, pornography incorporates acts of harm which include but are not limited to the torture and murder of female victims.

            As MacKinnon’s text progresses, her awareness of the role that racism plays in perpetuating hateful, sexist speech-based value systems becomes evident. For example, she notes that the “sexualization of racism” (23) is as an aspect of the hate speech that exists in pornography. MacKinnon goes on to discuss how words used within work spaces can and do constitute vitriolic expressions designed to harm black people. She also draws attention to how the court system has been effective in picking up on the presence of this hate speech and critiquing excuses made to legitimate its expression. For example, MacKinnon notes that “One court rejected the defendant’s argument that because racial slurs were common parlance, they did not have racial overtones” (48).  Here, MacKinnon explains that the racist verbage articulated by the individual in question was followed by an excuse designed to prevent the racist nature of the words from being assessed; the excuse was that because the racial slurs were commonly accepted and integral to normative discourse, the words did not convey subtle racism.  Clearly, the commonality or normalcy of racist verbal expressions does not function as proof that they are not meant to convey racism. For example, the “n” word can be repeatedly used such that individuals within any given ideological or cultural milieu are acclimated to its utterance, but their acclimation to its utterance does not negate or even diminish the racist import of the word. It simply means that it has become common to articulate racist sentiments aloud. This is the reality that the court apparently comprehended when rejecting the defendant’s attempt to have his racial slurs excused and interpreted as non-racist, harmful words.  

In noting a court’s ability to accurately define hate speech as hate speech and juxtaposing it to the court’s resistance to construing pornography as detestable, harmful language, we can see a central idea which MacKinnon expresses and reiterates throughout her text: sexist pornography, like racist speech, is not just words which constitute creative expression or harmlessly reiterate social norms. Racist speech—such as racial slurs—is the expression of racism. Sexist pornography, contrary to what its proponents regularly assert when its existence and expression is challenged, is the expression of sexism. More specifically, it is hateful and hurtful speech in the contexts of both how the films and images are produced (a process which involves physically harming women) and how they are reused in other spaces, such as the work world, to sexually harass and intimidate women.

One of the many effective examples MacKinnon provides to illustrate this point reads thus:

In a case involving pornography as sexual harassment, the employer argued that pornography at work was protected expression, something the workers at Jacksonville Shipyards wanted to say to first-class welder Lois Robinson, their opinions about women and sex. Their “views” included naked women supposedly having sex with each other; a woman masturbating herself with a towel; a nude woman on a heater control box with fluid coming from her vaginal area; a woman with long blonde hair (like Lois) wearing only high heels and holding a whip (one welding tool is called a “whip”); and countless women in full labial display. When Lois Robinson protested, the men engaged in more of what the ACLU brief against her termed “speech” by posting a sign stating “Men Only.” Suddenly, because Lois Robinson’s sexual harassment complaint centered on pornography, her sexual harassment claim invoked the First Amendment, at least so far as relief was concerned (53).

Here, the hateful nature of what sexist men are “saying” to Lois Robinson becomes plain. They are saying that women exist for male sexual pleasure, and this construct of pleasure transpires within a dehumanizing framework in which female people are reduced to sexualized objects, rather than being viewed as sentient living entities with thoughts and feelings, by representation as their sexualized body parts. They are presented thus in order to convey the male preference that they simply exist as entities who titillate men by engaging in intercourse with one another or by displaying their genitals in a manner which conveys that they are ready and willing to have sex with the man or men observing them.

            When Lois Robinson objects to these dehumanizing displays of female people, what the men “say” to her is that she will be punished with sex-based ostracization. Specifically, since she will not consent to being sexually harassed with dehumanizing images of women and therefore express agreement with their ideal image of a sexually objectified woman, they will excommunicate her from their social realm by stating that only men are allowed to engage and interact with one another. Both the men’s display of pornographic material and the posting of the “Men Only” sign constitute acts of hateful sexism; the first reinforces the notion that the ideal woman is a sexually submissive non-sentient entity who appears and acts in “sexual” ways that please men,[1] while the second reiterates the idea that women who refuse to express approval of these images and the ideologies they represent will be subjected to exclusion from interaction with other members of society. Clearly, the speech submitted by the men is not a collection of harmless signs and symbols which constitute debate and discussion. They are, rather, discriminatory acts. That they are acts and not mere speech is perhaps most effectively elucidated when we consider how the posting of the “Men Only” sign constitutes the process of segregating men from women; here, the act is physically separating males and females so that they do not occupy the same space based on a member of the latter group’s refusal to accept and adopt the sexually subordinating logic of the former group. To paraphrase, the separation is a form of segregation and it is a punitive act.

            As MacKinnon’s text draws near to its conclusion, she reemphasizes the way the legal system ensures the ongoing violation and degradation of women through assent to the idea that pornography is protected speech. To do so, she references the principle of First Amendment absolutism, the legal philosophy which indicates that there are no exceptions to the prohibition of the government limiting freedoms of speech, press, religion, etc. Specifically, MacKinnon asserts that “it was the prospect of losing access to pornography that impelled the social and legal development of absolutism as a bottom line for the First Amendment …” (97). To paraphrase, insistence that the First Amendment can and only should be interpreted as allowing all types of speech to exist without government prohibition was rooted in the proponents of pornography wanting to ensure that they would maintain continual access to it. MacKinnon goes on to point out that interest in promoting equality functions as an argument which delegitimates assent to interpreting the First Amendment through the lens of absolutism. In making this concept plain, MacKinnon states that “Wherever equality is mandated, racial and sexual epithets, vilification, and abuse should be able to be prohibited, unprotected by the First Amendment” (108). To paraphrase, in regions of the country where equality is legally required (rather than only culturally or ideologically approved), speech that constitutes the expression of racist and sexist sentiment should be deemed impermissible, and, in these cases, the First Amendment should not be interpreted to legitimate their expression. MacKinnon’s conclusions, amongst other things, reveal that the First Amendment can be used to bolster or discredit hate speech, meaning that its value in context of creating argumentation against pornography is rooted in its interpretation. To paraphrase, the First Amendment can be made to say whatever people within any given ideological realm want it to, and those who support equality should be cognizant of this when they challenge the production and proliferation of racist, sexist speech.

            When considered as a composite whole, Catharine Mackinnon’s Only Words is a radical feminist masterpiece which, through the use of logic and sustained analysis, reveals the role that male supremacy continues to play in shaping law, public discourse, the ongoing degradation of women, and the valuation of male prurient proclivities over the humanity of female people. Individuals who choose to read this text will attain the expansive awareness of how patriarchy operates, an awareness that is necessary to continue addressing its harms and devising tenable solutions which will contribute to the development of a world that is safer for non-whites and non-males.

[1] To further understand why the patriarchal reconstruction of woman into a nonthinking sexualized object constitutes hatred, consider how it represents resistance to the idea of a thinking female being who, through the act of thought, could actively resist her identity being muted or mutated to fit within a sexually subordinating framework she views as demeaning or otherwise inappropriate. This is what woman-hating is truly about: hating the aspect of female humanity-cognition-which could resist and reject the male attempt to diminish womanhood to the realm of objectification. What is being hated about a woman therefore is 1. Her capacity to think and 2. Her capacity to think outside of the objectifying ideologically framework devised by men.

Interesting thread over at clovenhooves:

https://clovenhooves.org/showthread.php?tid=1616&pid=5639#pid5639

Well worth the read. And it’s great to be able to search imdb.com (film database) by director, for your next watch!

Despite popular opinion to the contrary, Andrea Dworkin never asserted that “All heterosexual sex is rape.” She did, however, draw attention to the parallels that exist between heterosexual sex and rape. Specifically, in her important text Intercourse, Dworkin asserted that “Violation is a synonym for intercourse.” To understand the significance of the assertion, let’s view this section of the text together: 

A human being has a body that is inviolate; and when it is violated, it is abused. A woman has a body that is penetrated in intercourse: permeable, its corporeal solidness a lie. The discourse of male truth—literature, science, philosophy, pornography—calls that penetration violation. This it does with some consistency and some confidence. Violation is a synonym for intercourse. At the same time, the penetration is taken to be a use, not an abuse; a normal use; it is appropriate to enter her, to push into (“violate”) the boundaries of her body. She is human, of course, but by a standard that does not include physical privacy. She is, in fact, human by a standard that precludes physical privacy, since to keep a man out altogether and for a lifetime is deviant in the extreme, a psychopathology, a repudiation of the way in which she is expected to manifest her humanity (154). 

Here, Dworkin references how male-dominated spheres–such as literature, science, philosophy, pornography–conceptualize the penetration that transpires in heterosexual sex as violation. She goes on to point out that this penetration/violation is not conceptualized as abusive but rather a practice of normalcy and appropriateness. In recognizing these assertions, the reader can note the significance of Dworkin stating that “Violation is a synonym for intercourse.” She means that heterosexual sex involves a man penetrating a woman’s vagina with his penis; this process is viewed as a form of violation and the violation is not viewed as a problem. Dworkin problematizes this patriarchal view of intercourse in many ways, including by drawing attention to the way that women who refuse to engage in this heterosexual sex are deemed insane–deviants who are inundated in a realm of psychopathology which constitutes a deviation from the societal norms which construe female humanity in context of willing submission to heterosexual intercourse. 

Furthermore, thinking of intercourse as similar to or a lot like rape is something that individuals who are regularly exposed to mainstream/malestream logic regarding sex will be disinclined to do, likely due to their immersion in patriarchal systems of thought which want to ensure that men are never punished for subjecting women to sexual violence. After all, one way to ensure that men can evade social, cultural, and legal punishment for raping women is to assert that what transpired–no matter how violent, coercive, or nonconsensual–was actually sex, not rape. This is at least part of the reason why phrases such as “bad sex” or “rough sex” frequently begin to circulate when a woman asserts that she has been raped. Mainstream/malestream people, who are essentially male apologists who work to legitimate and perpetuate male power by pretending that men can do no wrong, quickly rework reality with rhetoric that moves minds away from conceptualizing rape as rape while moving minds towards viewing rape as sex. If rape is viewed as sex, a man who rapes a woman need not fear punishment from people, court systems, and any other sentient force capable of administering a penalty.  

Next, it’s important to understand why an individual might suggest that a feminist has made an assertion such as “All sex is rape.” I suggest that the intent is to insinuate or openly state that feminists regularly make ludicrous statements and therefore, they, along with their ideology, are absurd and not to be listened to. To elaborate, “all sex is rape” resituates the ideology and practices of radical feminists as outside the normative discourse which mainstream/malestream individuals promote through phrasings such as “bad sex” and “rough sex.” Within mainstream/malestream logic (which is also illogic), rape cannot happen because its existence would lead to awareness of male depravity. Therefore, women who come forward with accusations of rape are suppressed and silenced with rebuttals that include illogic like “You were not raped; you had bad sex and now regret it” or “You were not raped; you simply had rough sex and perhaps did not enjoy the more violent aspects of it.”

Finally, and per conversation with Peg Tittle, it is important to understand the role that the phrase “nonconsensual sex” plays in enabling us to comprehend the mainstream/malestream’s attempt to pretend that rape doesn’t exist while also asserting that individuals who discuss it are only doing so in nonsensical ways that involve suggesting that all sex is rape. As stated earlier, individuals who promote male supremacy do so by articulating their own illogical understandings of rape through masking terms such as “bad sex” and “rough sex.” This is why phrases like “nonconsensual sex” are not normalized when discourses regarding what rape is and whether rape has happened arise amongst individuals who promote mainstream/malestream logic. The reason the phrase “nonconsensual sex” has not been normalized (while phrases such as “rough sex” and “bad sex” have) is to continually erase from consciousness the reality that nonconsensual sex is happening. This is why patriarchal powers do not want the word “rape” and the phrase “nonconsensual sex” circulating during discourse pertaining to whether a woman has been raped, whether rape is a substantive problem, and whether punishments for rape should be more severe. The patriarchal powers that exist, as well as the individuals who have chosen to ideologically align themselves with those powers in order to gain social privilege and avoid the risk of losing various resources, want euphemisms or words that blatantly misrepresent reality.

The linguistic erasures pertaining to rape are not confined to utilizing terms like “rough sex” and “bad sex” in place of “nonconsensual sex” and “rape.” It also pertains to the realms of prostitution and sex trafficking. Specifically, individuals who operate in mainstream/malestream communities rarely use the phrase rape slaves to describe prostitutes, nor do they use the term paid rape to describe the process of men buying women. Yet this is exactly what happens within the institution of prostitution. Men pay to subject women to various forms of violent sex, including rape, with rape being the process through which a thinking feeling sentient being is reduced to a robotic slave who follows the orders of a male master. Yet, within mainstream/malestream realms, the depth of these horrors must be masked with terms like “sex work” that disguise oppression as a vocation involving consensual sex. The use of masking terms like “sex work” disguises the system of oppression so that, in thinking that prostitution is simply a process of exchanging sex for money, people will find no fault in it and allow slavery to keep existing without contention.

To repeat, Andrea Dworkin never stated that “all sex is rape.” However, radical feminists can learn a lot regarding how male supremacy and the people who support it operate by examining why she has been accused of making this assertion. Ultimately, the accusation that Dworkin asserted that “all sex is rape” reveals how individuals who support patriarchy seek to make their illogical understandings of rape and sex seem rational while rendering the logical analyses of radical feminists insane and unworthy of consideration.

Foul Play: The Colonization of Women’s Sports

Written six years ago, but still great.

Take a look, especially, at the graphic distinguishing between equality and equit.